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ABSTRACT 
Although considerable research is being carried out on the phenomenon 
of immigration to Greece, there is a notable lack of scientific attention 
on the recent resurgence of emigration at times of recession and 
austerity. Aiming to partly fill in this gap, this paper contextualizes the 
recent resurgence of emigration within Greece’s changing and 
complexifying migratory landscape. In so doing, and drawing on 
quantitative and qualitative data, the paper describes the magnitude, 
dynamics and main destinations of the current crisis-driven emigration 
and outlines its demographics makeup. It further provides evidence on 
the multiplicity of migration trajectories and discusses the prospect of 
return and the potential of the development of transnational economic 
ties between Greece and its highly skilled emigrants. 
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Greece’s new Emigration at times of Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally an emigration country, Greece became a target destination 
for immigration in the early 1970s. This process gathered momentum 
during the 1990s and since then, population influxes have become 
crucial factors of societal change, largely monopolising public discussion 
and academic research on migration. Yet, in the last few years, at a time 
when Greece is suffering deeply from the economic crisis and 
concomitant austerity measures, as well as their social and political 
consequences, a renewed public discussion on emigration has appeared. 
In this discussion, rising unemployment and steep decreases in salaries 
and welfare allowances are cited as push factors contributing to what is 
seen as the emergence of a new emigration wave from the country. 
There is already extended media coverage of this new emigration, which 
is presented as an one-way option for certain population segments, such 
as the young and the highly skilled, and hence a drain of the most 
dynamic part of the country’s labour force (Pratsinakis et al 
forthcoming). Despite this attention, however, little is known about the 
current intensification of emigration from Greece, its characteristics, and 
the aspirations and experiences of the emigrants. 
In fact, emigration from Greece never ceased as such, even if it 
remained numerically insignificant as compared to the inflows. The 
establishment of the right to free movement, employment and 
settlement across the European Union (EU) for Greek citizens in 1988 
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allowed for unrestricted mobility, although this never took the form of 
mass outflows. Apart from Greek emigrants of the post-war wave and 
their offspring moving between Greece and European destinations, and 
increased number of students abroad (Karamesini 2010), this primarily 
concerned special population categories, for instance people belonging 
to minority groups such as the Muslims of Thrace, or, later on, the (then 
recently settled) Diaspora Greeks from the former Soviet Union 
(Pratsinakis 2002, 2013; Voutira 2006). At the same time, a wave of 
Greek scientists and professionals leaving the country in search of better 
career opportunities and prospects abroad has been always in place but 
became more prominent since the 1990s (Labrianidis 2011). In the last 
few years, outmigration of professionals is further intensifying as job 
opportunities are shrinking in the shadow of the crisis (Pelliccia 2013; 
Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014; Labrianidis 2014).  
Yet unfavourable socio-economic developments and rampant 
unemployment are not only intensifying emigration flows among the 
highly skilled, but altering mobility aspirations and decisions of people of 
various socio-economic backgrounds for diverse destinations (Pratsinakis 
et al forthcoming; Damianakos 2014; Tamis 2014; Konstandinidis 2014; 
Mihopoulos 2014). They ever complexify Greece’s migration map, as the 
country still receives significant immigration flows of people of diverse 
origins, many of whom aim to also move further to other European 
destinations as the crisis in Greece is deepening, and while thousands of 
refugees, primarily from Syria and Iraq, have gotten stranded in Greece 
in their attempt to seek asylum in the countries of Northern Europe after 
the country’s northern borders were closed.  
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The current complexification of migration patterns, which is not only 
endemic in Greece but is found in many countries, forces us to 
acknowledge the temporal coexistence and intersectionality of 
emigration and immigration and the possibility of reversal of 
developmental trajectories (see Hatziprokopiou et al forthcoming). In 
the new global migration map, several countries are experiencing both 
emigration and immigration flows of a considerable scale (King and Conti 
2013; Okolski 2012). This empirical reality led Castles and Miller (2009) 
to propose the proliferation of migration transition as a general 
tendency in the ‘age of migration’ – i.e. the temporal coexistence of 
various stages of ‘the migration transition’ in many countries.  
In Greece, which exemplifies this tendency, considerable research is 
being carried out on the phenomenon of immigration. Yet scientific 
attention on the recent resurgence of emigration at times of recession 
and austerity remains rather limited, calling for more research in that 
area.  As a step in that direction, this paper presents the findings of a 
nationwide representative survey (HO survey) that was conducted 
through the funding of the National Bank of Greece, awarded to the first 
author by the London School of Economic’s Hellenic Observatory in the 
2014 research projects call. The HO survey was compiled during March-
April 2015 by telephone interviewing, using the Greek phones database 
(www.greekphones.gr) that contains more than 6,000,000 landline 
numbers, aiming to provide a comprehensive overview of the key 
characteristics of the outflow.  It was administered by the University 
Research Institute (EPI) through a stratified sampling method based on 
the household as unit of analysis. A structured questionnaire was 
addressed to a total of 1237 households comprising 3970 people and 
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generated information for 248 emigrants, approximately one third of 
whom had left Greece after 2010. Each individual interviewed was first 
asked to provide detailed personal information and information about 
the composition of the household she/he formed part of. She/he was 
then asked questions about the migration intentions of the members of 
the household and the migration practices of the members of her/his 
household and descending nuclear family.  
The paper also presents data from a (non-random) smaller scale online 
survey (newdiaspora survey) that was distributed in December 2015 
through the website and social media pages of newdiaspora, a 
participatory media channel of the new generation of Greeks living 
abroad during the crisis in their homeland (www.newdiaspora.com). This 
survey focused on the highly skilled migrants and aimed to complement 
the HO survey data on migration motivations, the prospects of return, 
and the development of transnational economic ties. Concretely, 81 
university graduates participated. Two out of three of the participants 
hold a postgraduate degree and one out of three holds a PhD degree or 
was a PhD candidate at the time of the survey. 
Finally, the survey data are enriched with insights from field research 
conducted in Amsterdam with which we aimed to look at individual 
stories in a more systematic way. Concretely, under the same funding, 
the second author conducted ten in-depth and ten less detailed 
interviews with Greek men and women aged between 23 and 40 years 
old who have immigrated to Amsterdam, including four people who had 
returned to Greece at the time of the research. He has also conducted 
participant observation and several informal interviews with people in 
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the Greek community house in the same city as part of his on-going IF 
Marie Curie EUMIGRE project. 
The structure of the paper unfolds as follows: First, we briefly present 
the patterns of immigration to Greece in the past few decades in order 
to situate the current resurgence of emigration within the country’s 
ever-complex migratory landscape. Second, we draw on available 
primary and secondary data to outline the key features of the new 
emigration addressing the outflows of both non-Greek and Greek 
citizens. Then, in the main part of the paper, we focus on the latter 
category, the Greek citizens, discussing the results of the HO survey. 
Having described the magnitude, dynamics and main destinations of the 
current crisis-driven emigration, we go on to describe its demographics, 
drawing comparisons with previous population outflows, such as the so-
called post-war ‘guest worker’ emigration and the emigration of 
professionals that took place in the directly preceding decades. In the 
final section, drawing primarily on the qualitative material and the 
newdiaspora survey, we provide evidence on the multiplicity of 
migration trajectories and discuss the prospect of return and the 
potential of the development of transnational economic ties between 
Greece and its highly skilled emigrants. In the concluding section, we 
attempt a general assessment of the evidence presented.  
2. Greece’s complex migration map 
 
Since the end of the 19th century, Greece had been a major source 
country for emigration. In the mid-1970s it acquired a positive migratory 
balance for the first time in its recent history, largely due to return 
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migration from Western Europe. In the same period, it started attracting 
a modest number of immigrants (Nikolinakos 1975), a process that 
became numerically significant during the 1990s, when the immigrant 
population more than quadrupled in size, making the country a de facto 
destination for international migrants. This transition, and its underlying 
factors, coincided with similar pathways of other southern European 
countries (King 2000). Looking back more than 25 years later, one may 
distinguish among three phases in the development of Greece’s 
migratory landscape (see Hatziprokopiou et al forthcoming).  
The first phase, which marked the 1990s, was closely connected to the 
disintegration of the former Eastern bloc and was caused by two distinct 
population movements: undocumented immigration from the Balkans 
and immigration of people of Greek descent (Pratsinakis 2014).  The 
second phase was initiated in the late 1990s – early 2000s and was 
characterised by the diversification and globalisation of immigration 
flows and by the on-going process of European integration. The global 
economic downturn and Greece’s escalating debt crisis mark the 
transition to a third phase starting from the late 2000s. On the outset, 
tough migration control policies in other South European countries and 
related agreements with their neighbouring countries, diverted the bulk 
of undocumented immigration to the EU through the Greek borders: in 
2010, an estimated 90 percent of all apprehensions for unauthorized 
entry into the EU took place in Greece, compared to 50 percent in 2008 
(Kasimis 2012). This, together with longstanding inadequacies of the 
Greek asylum system, marked by extremely low approval rates, as well 
as the EU approach to asylum based on the Dublin Regulation, gave way 
to a creeping humanitarian crisis affecting people trapped in Greece 
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without documents and hence without rights, particularly evident in 
Athens and in western port cities where most newcomers concentrated. 
In practice, this had turned Greece into a ‘storagehouse’ for immigration 
that is unwanted by the countries of the north. Currently the so-called 
refugee crisis is dramatically unfolding along with EU’s ever-toughening 
attempts to limit the number of incoming asylum seekers, and  Greece’s 
Eastern islands are the major entry points in the extremely perilous 
journey taken by the refugees, the majority of  whom originate in war-
torn Syria. And while in the outset of the refugee crisis Greece was a 
transit country in refugees’ attempt to reach the countries of Western 
and Northern Europe, the EU’s policy of sealing the northern borders of 
Greece reinforced the country’s role as a ‘storagehouse’ for unwanted 
immigration and as an internal borderland of migration control within 
the EU territory.  
 
3.  A new turnaround? 
 
3.1  The “emigration of immigrants” 
Yet, in this last phase, immigration is just one side of the coin, 
emigration being the other, with population outflows growing steeply 
after year 2010, as seen in graph one. Even though not attracting much 
media attention, non-Greek citizens comprise a considerable part of this 
new emigration wave; according to Eurostat data, non-Greek citizens 
seem to account for almost half of the outflow in the 2010-2013 period 
(see table 2), namely, 187,369 people. The emigration of non-Greek 
nationals is only partly reflected on the 2011 Census data and only for 
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the population of nationals of ‘developed’ countries (such as Canadians, 
Swedes, US citizens and Australians), which decreased significantly 
between 2001-2011. This decrease probably relates to the emigration of 
foreign employees following their companies shutting down or 
relocating in the context of the market downturn, as well as to the 
outflow of foreign-born people of Greek roots who had recently 
‘returned’ to Greece.  
Figure 1. The emigration outflow in the period of crisis  
 
 Source: Eurostat 
At the same time the difficulties related to the crisis have had a direct, 
and one may say more acute and consequential, impact also on less 
privileged categories of migrants who, even if this is not depicted by the 
Census1, account for the largest part of the emigration flow among the 
people without Greek citizenship. For nationals of new EU member 
states in particular, their countries’ recent accession opens up a range of 
new mobility patterns that may provide alternatives as circumstances in 
Greece deteriorate (e.g. Hatziprokopiou and Markova 2014, on 
                                                 
1
 Despite the trend of immigrants leaving the country after the beginning of the crisis, the overall 
immigrant population has grown considerably between 2001-2011 as has had the population for most 
nationalities. 
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Bulgarians in Greece considering to return). Albanians, too, severely 
affected by rising unemployment, may take advantage of proximity and 
the recent visa-free travel regulations to move to Albania for some time 
before migrating to a new destination, or to engage in circular 
movements linked to seasonal work in Greece; return migration does 
take place but seems to be a rather ambivalent project and not 
necessarily a definitive one, especially for the second generation (Gemi 
2013; Michail 2013;  Kapetanaki 2015). At the same time, leaving Greece 
is also an option, necessity or fate for migrants from more distant lands. 
First, deportations and ‘voluntary returns’ of undocumented migrants, 
predominantly from Pakistan and Afghanistan, had intensified in the last 
few years (Yousef 2013, 21-22; Dimitriadi 2013, 19, 25). In addition, an 
outflow of undocumented migrants transiting through Greece towards 
northern European destinations, initially via the port of Patras and then 
via the Balkan route until the Northern Borders were closed, was 
underway from the late 2000s.  
Table 1. Emigration from Greece, 2010-2013  
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Greek citizens 28301 53210 65264 62089 
Non Greek citizens  33740 39194 59430 55005 
Total emigration 62041 92404 124694 117094 
 
Source: Eurostat Database, `Emigration by sex, age group and citizenship,’ 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi1ctz&lang=en 
Accessed on 24/6/2015 
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 3.2  The emigration of Greek citizens 
 
Concerning the emigration of Greek citizens, it is interesting to note that 
until recently Greek citizens have notably been amongst the least mobile 
Europeans. A Eurobarometer survey on geographic and labour market 
mobility, conducted in 2005, showed that Greeks were the least 
favorable Europeans (after the Cypriots) towards long distance mobility 
(European Commission 2006). Another survey, conducted in 2009, just a 
year before the crisis started deepening in Greece, showed that only 
eight per cent of Greeks envisaged working abroad sometime in the 
future (the lowest after that of Italians), while the share of Greeks who 
would be ready to work in some other country in case of unemployment 
at home was found to be well below the EU average (European 
Commission 2010). Yet this was soon due to change. In 2014, more than 
one out of three Greeks claimed that they would be willing to emigrate 
in search for work (Newpost 2014), and the share appears to be 
markedly higher among the educated young adults who form the 
category most prone to emigrate2.  Despite the previously recorded 
scepticism towards emigration, many Greeks were forced by the 
circumstances to change their views on and plans about external 
mobility in a very short time span. As an indication of this trend, CV 
submissions to the Europass portal have increased exponentially in the 
past few years: in 2014, 54,000 CVs were submitted from Greece, 2.6 
times more than in 2011 and nine times those of 2007. 
 
What happened in the meantime was the combined effect of crisis, 
austerity, recession, and a generalised mistrust towards institutions and 
                                                 
2
 A survey conducted in 2010 to young (22-35 years old) Greek adults with university education 
demonstrates that 73 per cent of the respondents had already taken steps to that end (Chiotis 2010).   
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disillusionment from the political system in the country. To give just an 
obvious example: in the first trimester of 2014, the unemployment rate 
in Greece rose to 27.8 per cent, more than double that of 2010 and 
more than triple than in 2008; notably, the rate for the youngest cohort 
of the workforce exceeded 56 per cent. The same period saw dramatic 
cuts in earnings and allowances (e.g. Matsaganis 2013). These 
unfavourable socio-economic conditions are drastically changing 
mobility intentions and aspirations. They are turning emigration into a 
necessary survival strategy for many people who are finding it hard to 
make ends meet, while, at the same time, they render emigration an 
increasingly appealing option for others in less pressing need who see 
their career potentials being critically reduced3.  
 
Indeed, a large number of people seem to have already taken that step. 
According to EUROSTAT data, as shown in Table 1, 208,864 Greeks left 
the country in the 2010-2013 period4. According to the findings of the 
HO survey 222,500 Greek citizens emigrated from 2010 until the time 
when survey was conducted (March-April 2015)5. Yet the HO data 
                                                 
3
 Besides international migration, the crisis seem to have influenced patterns of internal migration too. 
Although the centralised geography of the Greek productive and employment structures still holds, 
affecting internal movements towards Athens and other major urban centres, a new trend of counter-
urbanization seems to be gaining pace in the context of the crisis, which even though outside of the 
paper’s main focus needs to be noted here. Drawing on in-depth interviews with urban to rural 
migrants, Gkartzios (2013) underlines the emergence of a ‘crisis counterurbanisation’ in Greece 
triggered largely by unemployment at origin, rather than pro-rural motivations and idyllic constructions 
of rurality. Migrants’ stories also highlight the importance of the extended family in counter-urban 
movements, in terms of the location of destination and the multiple support offered. In addition, a study 
commissioned by the Greek Government (Ministry of Rural Development and Food, 2012) involving 
residents in Athens and Thessaloniki (Greece’s main metropolitan areas) shows that almost seven out 
of ten of respondents have thought of moving to rural areas in Greece. More than half of those 
respondents are aged between 25 and 39 years old and almost 20% has already started organizing their 
relocation. Further research is necessary to enquire into the characteristics of this migration as well as 
to into how different migration alternatives are considered and pursued at times of crisis.  
4
 Interestingly, from mid-2014 to mid-2015 EUROSTAT changed three times the statistics on Greek 
emigration, in all cases downscaling the outflow. 
5
 For our estimations we used the “native” Greek population that is, the total population excluding 
foreign nationals of the 2011 Census as the reference population. Therefore we accordingly excluded 
from our sample 1) those (35) Greek emigrants who had left Greece before 2011 and had not returned 
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modestly underestimate the total size of the outflow as they 1) may 
underrepresent the emigration of minority Greeks, namely people 
belonging to the Muslim minority and people originated in the former 
Soviet Union,  who according to anecdotal information seem to have 
emigrated at a higher rate than the rest of Greeks (following trends 
predating the crisis; Voutira 2006; Pratsinakis 2002); 2) miss a segment 
of those emigrants who emigrated together with their extended 
families; and 3) finally, do not record those emigrants whose families 
(with which they reunited) were already abroad before the crisis and 
thus are not reachable via the sampling method followed.  The second 
and third categories primarily concern emigrants who moved to 
destination countries of earlier migrations, e.g. Germany, Australia, USA, 
Canada and according to estimation provided in Damanakis et al (2014), 
comprise a sizeable segment of the emigration flow, especially that 
which took place in the years immediately after the deepening of crisis.  
 
Assuming that emigration continued strong until the end of 2015 and 
taking into account the estimations in Damanakis and the fact that the 
emigration of the minority Greeks may have been modestly larger than 
that recoded, we may estimate that the total emigration outflow of 
Greeks from 2010 until the end of 2015 ranges between 280,000 and 
350,000 people. Given our finding on return migration in that period, 
                                                                                                                                            
before that year and 2) the (62) non-Greek citizens since they were significantly underrepresented 
reflecting a sample bias stemming primarily from the fact that many of them do not have landlines. 
Hence the sample size on which the projection is based is N=3970-62-35=3873. Finally, concerning the 
sub-sample of the post-2010 emigrant population, it should be mentioned that we included not the 
spouses of the recorded emigrants who, according our methodology belong to a different ascending 
nuclear family and thus form not part of our sample. We did add, however, half of the emigrants’ 
children population that live together with them abroad (N=24/2=12). According to our methodology, 
the emigrants’ children population we should split between the families of the two spouses. As a result 
the sub-sample of the post-2010 emigrant comprises 87 people, 75 emigrants and 12 children. 
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which was recorded to be 15% of the total outflow, we may then safely 
estimate that more than 240,000 post-2010 emigrants are currently 
living abroad. At the same time the data of the HO survey hint that the 
emigration will further grow strongly in the years to come. 3,6% of our 
sample, or else approximately 355,500 Greek citizens were planning to 
emigrate within the next year. Even if most likely only a minority will 
actually do so, the findings are indicative of the emigration dynamics at 
the time of the survey. 
 
Thus, at the dawn of the new millennium, the crisis signals a 
complexification or even a turnaround of Greece’s migration transition. 
Emigration flows in the post-2010 period appear to be comparable in 
size with those of post-war decades. There are, however, significant 
differences in their characteristics, with the current emigration wave 
taking place simultaneously with ongoing immigration to or through the 
country, and being much more diverse than in the past. As we will show, 
this diversity does not only concern the ethnic background of emigrants 
but also their social class, qualifications, demographic features and 
destinations abroad. In the next section we provide evidence of this 
diversity and its implications, drawing primarily on the HO survey data.  
 
4.  The characteristics of the emigration outflow 
 
4.1  Migration destinations 
A first observation deriving from the dataset concerns the diversity of 
emigrant destinations during the crisis period. As also found by 
Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014), new emigrants are heading to various 
destinations, many more than in previous decades, from the Middle East 
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to the Far East and from East Europe and the Balkans to Canada and 
Australia. The vast majority, however, seem to be heading to EU 
countries. Germany and the UK in particular attract by far the largest 
share of the outflows concentrating together more than half of the post-
2010 emigration. According to our HO survey data, the USA and 
Australia seem to be the next most popular destinations, closely 
followed by several other European destinations, namely the 
Netherlands, Sweden, France, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. 
However, given that the data provided by Tamis (2014) are accurate, we 
may clearly single out Australia as the third most significant destination 
of the new Greek emigration due to the ‘return’ of a  sizeable population 
of  ‘Greek Australians’ to Australia.  
 
4.2  The emigration of the highly educated 
In terms of the emigrants’ educational background, the HO survey data 
point to a clear differentiation over time. In the early years, emigration 
concerned primarily people of lower educational backgrounds; from the 
1990s onwards increasingly so the highly skilled (see figure 1). Until the 
mid-1970s emigration flows almost uniformly comprised people of lower 
education who left the country to fill in the gaps in the booming 
industrial sectors of Western countries, especially in Europe, and were 
later joined by their families. Emigration of highly skilled workers was 
already taking place but it only became numerically significant in the 
1990s, due to the increase of tertiary education graduates in the 
meantime. Until then, highly skilled migration was to a large extent a 
matter of choice for the middle and upper social classes, and most 
emigrants left the country for reasons other than employment. This 
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choice was often framed as an ‘escape’ from restrictions imposed by a 
parochial Greek society and as a desire to explore the world and live as 
cosmopolitans (Labrianidis 2011, 196-7).  
Figure 2. Emigrants’ educational background, by decade of emigration 
 
Source: HO Survey data  
Labour market restructuring led to the deterioration, over the 1990s, of 
employment opportunities for the cohorts born from the 1970s 
onwards, and the persistence of relatively high unemployment and job 
precariousness in the 2000s (Karamesini 2010). The substantial opening 
of higher education to these cohorts was not matched by a proportional 
rise in corresponding employment opportunities, resulting in relatively 
high unemployment rates among graduates. Although different 
educational levels gave access to jobs of different social status and 
prestige, young people of all education levels, including the highly 
educated, faced difficulties in making their transition from education to 
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work (ibid.). Whilst a segment of young graduates would be eventually 
absorbed in public sector employment, high proportions experienced 
unemployment, underemployment or employment in jobs unrelated to 
their skills. This was not mainly due to a supposed ‘over-education’ of 
Greeks, as conventionally assumed (Labrianidis 2011; 2014). Rather, the 
mismatch between supply and demand of graduates was primarily due 
to the structure of the Greek economy, more specifically to the limited 
demand for professionals from the private sector, as most companies 
produce low value added products and services (ibid.).  
As a result, even before the eruption of the crisis a considerable number 
of highly skilled young Greeks had been emigrating, mostly for reasons 
related to employment such as better career prospects, better chances 
of finding a job related to their specialization, satisfactory income, 
increasing their knowledge in their field and acquiring work experience 
abroad. Yet, the outmigration of graduates has critically intensified as 
job opportunities shrunk in the shadow of the crisis, and public sector 
employment is not a possibility anymore as a result of cuts and 
restrictions in new recruitments (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014; 
Labrianidis 2014). The HO survey shows that more than half of the total 
outflow of professionals recorded in the post war period took place after 
2010, thus highlighting the alarming rates that brain drain has acquired 
in the past few years.  
More than two out of three of the post-2010 emigrants are university 
graduates6. Moreover, one fourth of the total outflow concerns people 
                                                 
6
 Here it should be mentioned that our findings on the share of those with tertiary among the total post-
2010 outflow, that is 75% as seen in Figure 2, should be seen as the maximum estimate and it could be 
that their actual share is (modestly) smaller. The findings from an earlier survey (HIDDEN data set) 
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who hold postgraduate degrees or are graduates of medical and 
polytechnic schools. As seen in Figure 3, the share of those emigrants as 
part of the total emigration outflow has risen considerably after 2010. 
Thus it is not only the sheer size of the emigration of professionals that 
has vastly increased but also the percentage of those with the longest 
years in education, constituting a double brain drain for the country. 
Figure 3. Share of postgraduate and medical and polytechnic school 
graduate emigrants by decade of emigration 
 
Source: HO Survey data  
                                                                                                                                            
conducted a year earlier at the University of Macedonia with the same methodology as the HO survey, 
show a considerable increase in the outflow of people of middle educational backgrounds (ISCED 3,4) 
during the crisis period. Accordingly the outflow of graduates is found to be less significant (51%). 
Due to the increased number of missing values of the HIDDEN data in the migration questions we 
consider the findings of HO more reliable (see Labrianidis and Pratsinakis 2016). Yet given that the 
HO data on the post 2010 migration come from a limited number of people (N=75), it is also possible 
that due to statistical bias they overestimate the share of highly educated Greeks and the reality being 
somewhere in between the findings of the two surveys, approximately around 65%. In any case the 
overall conclusion drawn from both data sets is that the majority of the emigrants are university 
graduates yet a considerable share of people with lower educational backgrounds have left Greece too.  
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4.3  Other educational groups 
As can be derived from the previous analysis, the crisis seems to have 
amplified push factors that already existed in Greece for the highly 
skilled (Labrianidis 2011), intensifying their emigration patterns. But it 
has also impacted on the mobility aspirations and practices of people of 
other socio-economic backgrounds. Even though they form a minority, 
the crisis seems once again to push people of lower educational 
backgrounds out of the country, a finding that deconstructs a rather 
dominant assumption in Greek media, which especially in the earlier 
years represented the new Greek emigration wave as a phenomenon 
exclusively concerning the highly skilled (Pratsinakis, et. al. forthcoming). 
Our HO survey data indicate that there is a difference by country of 
destination in terms of the educational background of the emigrants. 
Those who immigrate to Britain are almost exclusively people with high 
education credentials, while Germany attracts a considerable number of 
people with low or middle educational backgrounds (43% of the total 
inflow), in addition to the highly educated. This is also the case for the 
Netherlands, as Pratsinakis, et. al. (forthcoming) show. 
According to the HO survey data, those with middle and lower levels of 
educational attainment mostly commonly find jobs abroad via their 
social networks, while highly educated emigrants find jobs mostly 
through personal solicitations. It thus seems that people of lower 
educational backgrounds immigrate to Germany and/or the Netherlands 
because they can make use of social networks that are available to them 
from earlier emigrations. As a result, former guestworker’s destinations 
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concentrate a much more diverse population in terms of the educational 
background of the immigrants in contrast to the UK and newer 
destination countries, such as Switzerland, which primarily attract the 
highly skilled. 
4.4  The economic situation of the emigrant’s household and the age 
composition of the emigration flow 
Concerning the economic background of the emigrants, we classified 
their ascending or direct family into five income categories, namely: 1) 
very high; 2) high; 3) medium; 4) middle to low; and 5) low and very low, 
by weighting the monthly income of their household and the number of 
household members. Our findings indicate that, after the year 2000, the 
households with very high incomes are the ones that are the most likely 
to ‘send’ emigrants abroad; a trend that stays strong also during the 
crisis period. In particular, for the 2010-2015 period, emigrants from 
households with very high incomes comprise 9% of the total outflow, 
even those households form only 2% of the total survey sample. 
Emigration is a costly project and thus more easily undertaken by those 
with means. However, drastic decrease of salaries and rising 
unemployment in the past years has led to a sharp increase in the 
emigration rate of people from “low to very low” income households. 
While before the crisis this category of people used to be the least prone 
to emigrate, they now constitute 28% of the post-2010 emigration 
outflow, a percentage that is on par with their share in the total sample 
(26%). 
 
Concerning the flows of remittances, according to the HO survey 
findings, the vast majority of migrants neither send nor receive money 
  20 
(68%). It thus appears that emigration contributes mainly to the 
subsistence and/or the socio-economic progress of the emigrants 
themselves and not of the household as a whole. Only 19% of emigrants 
(expectedly stemming mainly from low and very low income 
households) send money to Greece, while the remaining 13% receive 
economic support from Greece7. 
 
Change is also observed in the age composition of the emigrant 
population. According to the HO survey data, the mean age of the 
emigrant is 30,5 years old in the post-2010 period, which is two years 
higher than in the 2000-2009 period (28,3)  and six years higher than in 
the 1990-1999 period (24,3).  At the same time, a significant number of 
the emigrant population left Greece after their forties. This number was 
recorded at 11% of the total outflow, and it may in fact be slightly higher 
taking if we take into account the emigrant families that could not be 
recorded through our sampling method. The crisis has thus driven a 
significant percentage of people to take the route of emigration at a late 
phase in their life-course. Given the earlier discussed findings on 
migration intentions (Chiotis 2010; Newpost 2014), we may assume that 
the decision to emigrate for older people, as well as for those coming 
from lower educational backgrounds and lower income families, may be 
framed more as a matter of need than a (career) choice.  However, as 
will be highlighted in the following section, this seems to becoming a 
rather generalized condition in the current emigration wave concerning 
a significant segment of the highly educated emigrants, too. 
                                                 
7
 Similar data are also recorded by the newdiaspora survey, namely that most of the emigrants (64%) 
neither send nor receives remittance. Yet the newdiaspora survey, which was conducted 8 months later 
and among graduates only, indicated that currently sending money (25%) may have become more 
common, at least among the highly skilled migrants. 
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4.5  Migration motivations 
The paramount importance of the grim economic conditions prevailing 
in the country in shaping emigration decisions is reflected in the HO 
survey data about emigration motivations: 72 per cent of the post-2010 
migrants of the sample left Greece looking for (better) employment. 
Thus, although we witness a diversification of emigration flows in terms 
of the characteristics of migrants and their destinations, an opposite 
trend seems to be happening in terms of emigration motivations. 
Emigration appears to be largely driven by economic reasons in contrast 
to the more diverse emigration motivations during the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, it should be noted that despite providing an indication of a 
change that seems to have taken place, the above-cited data need to be 
approached with caution, since in many cases information stems not 
from the emigrants themselves but from family members speaking 
about the emigrant (see Labrianidis and Pratsinakis 2016).  
More reliable information can be obtained through the newdiaspora 
survey.  From the open answers of the respondents, it becomes clear 
that most of the pre-crisis emigrants, many of whom left for studies, saw 
their emigration as a significant career move. In contrast, it was a 
minority of the post-2010 emigrants who saw their emigration in that 
way. The majority emigrated due to feelings of lacking any prospects in 
their home country and due to an overall disappointed with the grim 
socio-economic situation in Greece which often went hand in hand with 
a deep disillusionment with the political establishment in Greece and 
with state institutions. Taking their answers into account helps us qualify 
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the HO survey data on emigration motivations. Rather than emigrating 
for strictly economic goals such as income maximization or career 
advancement, many highly skilled emigrants relocate abroad pushed by 
feelings of disappointment with the economic but also with the 
sociopolitical environment of crisis-ridden Greece and driven by broader 
aspirations for building a better life  abroad.  
Concerning our data on unemployment, a clear distinction emerges 
between the pre-crisis emigrants and those who left after 2010, who are 
far more pushed by the unfavorable conditions in the Greek labor 
market. The unemployed formed a small minority among pre-crisis 
emigrants while, according to both the HO and the newdiaspora survey, 
half of the emigrants who left after 2010 were unemployed at the time 
of emigration. Yet, even though lack of a job seems to be a major reason 
driving people out of the country, our data clearly show that it is not the 
only determining reason, since half of the emigrants were employed in 
Greece at the time of emigration. In agreement with the data cited 
above on emigration motivations, it seems that for a sizeable share of 
the higher educated emigrants it was not absolute exclusion from the 
labor market per se that drove their decision to migrate but the 
insecurity for their future in Greece and the quest for a better 
socioeconomic and political environment abroad. 
5. New emigration trajectories and the prospect of return 
 
As described, today’s crisis-driven emigrants differ from those of post-
war times in their socio-economic, educational and demographic 
characteristics. The macro-structural causes and developmental 
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conditions triggering emigration at present are also radically different. In 
addition, the context and infrastructure of current emigration is 
significantly altered from the past. Free movement within the EU makes 
emigration an easier mobility strategy to pursue, reducing its economic 
and psychological costs. Emigration is no longer seen as a once-in-a-life-
time decision, as people increasingly move spontaneously and 
temporarily, looking for potential opportunities mostly in Western and 
Northern Europe. At the same time, people are not supported by state 
institutions in their emigration trajectories as was the case in the post-
war period. 
 
The ‘new emigrants’ follow diverse mobility patterns. Some may leave 
with more permanent settlement intentions, after having collected 
enough information about life in their destination country but not 
always having already found a job there. Others emigrate for short-term 
periods as target earners, aiming to contribute to the family income, to 
respond to immediate financial need until ‘things get better in Greece’, 
or to support themselves as they wait for a job opening in the country. 
Others leave for short periods, hosted by friends or relatives who are 
already abroad, to inquire into the employment possibilities and life 
conditions through first-hand experience of everyday life in the country 
they visit. Many more apply for jobs from Greece, waiting to be called 
for an interview, and some of them do secure employment before 
settlement in the receiving country. 
 
According to the HO survey data, the majority of emigrants find work 
abroad in a relatively short time, a period between 0-6 months (81%). 
Yet there is also a minority who did not manage to find a job and 
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returned, and others who are currently unemployed abroad. The 
majority of emigrants (72%) are found to be working abroad in jobs that 
match their qualifications, while 21% of them are working below their 
skills and 6% are unemployed. However, these data should be treated 
with caution because for most cases it is not the migrant her/himself 
providing the answer but another member of the household (most 
commonly the parent). We may very well assume that the emigrant 
paints a more positive image of his/her situation to his/her parent. We 
were in fact able to at least partly affirm this assumption by comparing 
the jobs that the emigrants do abroad and their level and field of study.  
 
In addition, our qualitative data in Amsterdam, in accordance to 
previous research in Germany (Damanakis 2014b; Georgiou et al. 2013), 
show that several emigrants of those who have not secured employment 
before emigration, end up in low-skilled jobs for a considerable period 
before they manage to find jobs matching their qualifications; this is also 
the case for people of high educational backgrounds. Kostas, a trained 
hematologist, chose to emigrate to Amsterdam in 2012 because his 
aunt, Rina, runs a restaurant there. He was hosted at her place and 
worked in her restaurant until he earned enough money to rent his own 
flat. He then found a second job in a café nearby and a few months later 
he was offered an annual contract in a museum restaurant. At the same 
time, he has been learning Dutch and looking for jobs matching his 
credentials. The same pathway was earlier followed by Rina’s son-in-law, 
Petros, an engineer. After a year and a half working in several 
restaurants in Amsterdam, Petros found a well-paid job in his field. It 
took longer for Kostas to find such a job, but he was not disappointed. 
Although he claimed that things are considerably more difficult in the 
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Netherlands now than they were in 2009, when Petros arrived, Kostas 
was rather confident that sooner or later he will find a good job, too. He 
was not considering going back, since, as he said, he has no chances of 
finding any job in Greece. In a follow-up conversation, he told us that he 
did manage to find employment in a company in a sector close to his 
profession. He was happy with this development, even though he 
confessed he did not expect it would take him three years to meet this 
goal. 
 
In many cases, people prefer staying abroad over returning to Greece, 
even if they have to work in low-skilled jobs for prolonged periods of 
time. In Greece similar jobs are paid much less and usually do not 
provide social security. Some would have possibly refused to take jobs 
such as cleaning in Greece, not only due to low remuneration and lack of 
social security but also due to the low social status associated with them. 
They stay abroad aiming to upgrade their language skills and build social 
networks that will help them to eventually find better jobs.  
 
Many people start out by finding a job in Greek businesses −mostly 
restaurants− and then move on to other jobs. Some of them report 
exploitative working conditions: Andreas, who had worked in several 
Greek taverns, claimed that ‘he will never work for Greeks in the 
Netherlands again’. Yet people reported exploitative working relations 
with Dutch employers, too. Yorgos, who does not have a university 
education, came to Amsterdam looking for work in 2012. He found a job 
in the flower market but was very disillusioned from his emigration 
experience. His boss required him to stand still throughout the day, 
which physically exhausted him. He earned approximately 1200 euros a 
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month after taxes, the minimum wage in the Netherlands, which was 
much higher than any salary he ever had in Greece. The living costs were 
however much higher. Similarly to most newcomers, he could not afford 
renting an apartment on his own; he rented a room instead, costing him 
400 euros.  For these and similar reasons, not everybody decides to 
stay.. Some of the emigrants return triggered by job opportunities in 
Greece, but the majority because their migration experience turns out 
not to be according to their expectations.  
 
A large part of the newcomers in Amsterdam are comprised of students 
at Dutch Universities who overstay after completing their studies. Many 
of them treat their studies as a first step to materialize their emigration. 
Chrysa came to Amsterdam with her boyfriend to follow an MA program 
in Political Science, but after her studies she could not find employment 
that matched her qualifications. Being unemployed for one year, she 
decided to work voluntarily in an organization which hired her after 
eight months of unpaid work.  Achilleas, who had come for postgraduate 
studies in Social Sciences in Amsterdam, decided to prolong his stay, 
working in a big international hotel. However, after some time and 
having looked for job opportunities in his field, he felt that he had no 
chance of finding a job matching his qualifications in the near future, 
mainly due to insufficient knowledge of the language and a lack of social 
networks. Fully absorbed by the work rhythms of his hotel job, he felt 
that he was losing contact with his field of study. Although he was paid a 
salary he thinks he would not be able to achieve in Greece, he decided 
not to renew his contract. Prompted by a friend about the existence of 
job opportunities in his field in Greece, he started looking for a job 
related to his studies there, even if it would be a lower paid one. In a 
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follow-up discussion, Achilleas had managed to find a job related to his 
field of study on a three-month renewable contract with an NGO, and 
was preparing for his trip.  
 
Lastly, there are cases of people who were already abroad for study 
and/or temporary work before 2009, and, although many were not 
originally planning to stay for long, found themselves were confronted 
with the dilemma ‘to stay or return’ as the crisis started deepening in 
Greece. Most of them do remain abroad since returning to Greece 
appears risky and others do so when they have acquired the skills, 
knowledge, and capital to make a new start in Greece. Such is the case 
of Dimitra, who returned in 2011 and managed to open her own 
business in out-of-school extracurricular education in their home city in 
Greece.  For others, repatriation offers an alternative option in which 
non-financial motives are more important than financial ones. Niki 
studied music in De Haag from 2004 to 2012 while working in 
restaurants to financially support her studies. When she got her 
postgraduate diploma she returned to Greece, feeling rather 
disillusioned by her experience living in the Netherlands and missing her 
social life in Greece. She currently earns less than 200 euros a month 
giving music lessons, but she is much more satisfied with her life than 
when she was living in Den Haag. She recounted, however, that she had 
to defend her decision to friends in Greece who were critical of her on 
the basis of a rather idealistic image of life abroad. For Niki, her friends 
could not understand the difficulties and rather limited opportunities 
available to her to pursue a career in music in the Netherlands at a time 
of drastic cuts in state expenditures for culture, which had severely 
affected people working in the arts. For many who wished to leave 
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Greece, it seemed that she missed an opportunity that many of them 
felt they did not have.  
 
Niki’s experience also reveals that austerity policies alongside labour 
market developments significantly hamper employment opportunities in 
destination countries. At the same time, emigrants who do not have the 
‘right skills’ are not particularly welcome in western European countries 
and their settlement is less than easy. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
one has to have a social security number in order to start a formal job. In 
order to have a social security number, however, one has to have a 
registered address, which could be difficult without an employment 
contract8. Additionally, banks refuse to issue accounts to non-Dutch who 
neither have a job nor are in the Netherlands for study reasons.  
 
In a 2013 article, co-authored with the British campaigner for restrictions 
on immigration David Goodhart, the Dutch minister of social affairs and 
member of the Labour party Lodewijk Asscher, called the EU to rethink 
its commitment to the free movement of workers by highlighting what 
they considered to be its negative effects, namely wage dumping, 
exploitation and "crowding out" of local job seekers (Goodhart and 
Asscher 2013). Despite the fact that at that time the fear of massive 
influxes from Eastern Europe, on which the article focused, were proven 
to be overblown, the authors suggested that is time to signal 'Code 
Orange' alarm,  the warning that’s issued in the Netherlands when 
there’s a serious risk of flooding. More evocatively, the 2012-2013 
expulsions from Belgium of EU citizens on the grounds of their 
                                                 
8
 People not being able to register their stay in the Netherlands can acquire a social security number by 
enrolling themselves in the registry of non-inhabitants, which is intended for temporary migrants and is 
officially valid for a period of four months. 
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constituting an excessive burden, as well as British PM David Cameron’s 
assurances that the UK government has drawn plans for emergency 
immigration controls to curb a potential influx of Greeks (Watt 2012) if 
Greece is forced to leave euro, show that the right to free labour 
mobility in Europe for those not categorized as highly skilled is currently 
being practically contested and officially questioned in several countries 
of the EU.  
  
5.1  Return migration and the development of transnational economic 
ties 
In addition to the above-cited information gathered from the interviews 
with the emigrants in Amsterdam, we may derive some further 
information on return migration based on the data of the newdiaspora 
survey. For the majority of the respondents in this sample, all of whom 
had high educational credentials, their life abroad has met their 
expectations, and approximately three out of four evaluate their 
migration experience as a positive one. That is despite the fact that for 
many (40%) emigration brought about a deterioration in their social life. 
The vast majority however, report being very content as far as their 
employment conditions are concerned, particularly in terms of 
remuneration, prospects of career advancement, and relevance of their 
job to their educational background. Only 7% of the respondents were 
unemployed at the time of the research, and approximately two out of 
three of the respondents reported that they were never unemployed 
abroad. The majority of the informants found it neither easy nor difficult 
to access the labor market abroad, while the data, in accordance to 
those from the qualitative research in Amsterdam, indicate that the 
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graduates in social sciences, arts and humanities may experience more 
difficulties in finding a job. This is often due to lack of a high level of 
linguistic skills of the host country language ‒ a level which is often 
essential for finding employment in those sectors‒ as well as due to 
more restricted job opportunities.  
Despite their overall positive experiences abroad, however, half of the 
respondents had thought in the past or are currently thinking about the 
possibility of return. Similarly, in a hypothetical question of ‘where they 
would wish to live if they could find employment with similar conditions 
to those they currently have’, approximately half of the informants 
answered that they would go to Greece and 28% that they would share 
their time between Greece and their current country of residence. 
Expectedly, the respondents mentioned that they would return if they or 
their partners found a job that would satisfy them financially and/or a 
job that would match their skills (60%). A considerable number of people 
also mentioned that they would be willing to return to Greece if they felt 
that a significant change was underway in Greece (46%). That was also 
expressed in the answers of those respondents to the respective open 
question to which they mentioned a drive to contribute to the country, 
together with the wish to be closer to friends and family, as important 
reasons underlying their wish to return. Yet when the survey was 
conducted, only 15% of the respondents were planning to return within 
the next 2 years. For the majority, the socioeconomic conditions in 
Greece were considered particularly unfavorable to plan their return in 
the near future. However, most of the emigrants (64%) were more 
positive towards developing some kind of professional cooperation with 
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businesses, research centers, or other institutions in Greece, while 5% of 
them are already doing it.   
As already earlier argued (Labrianidis 2014), the country can benefit 
from Greek professionals abroad without necessarily focusing on a 
repatriation policy. Rather, it could handle this valuable human capital 
under the assumption that, in the foreseeable future, it will remain 
abroad. Consequently, what should be done in the short- and medium-
term emerges as a crucial challenge. Greece should recognise publicly 
and in the most formal way the fundamental value of this human capital. 
Concomitantly, it should facilitate the establishment of any possible 
means of cooperation between these people abroad and their home 
country. Some of them might decide, for a particular period, to combine 
work in both places. Even from afar, through meaningful collaborations 
between private businesses, universities, research centers, or even 
through the creation of their own businesses, Greek professionals could 
contribute to the transfer of know-how to Greece.  
In this way, Greece would benefit from the knowledge and experience 
these individuals possess, while, they would be able to enjoy ‘the best of 
both worlds’: they could continue to live and work abroad, but at the 
same time they would be able to have some sort of activity in Greece, 
which they would visit regularly on professional missions. This situation 
could serve as the ‘bridge’ that, in the future, might bring them back, 
with indisputable positive results for the Greek economy and society in 
general. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
After a period in which immigration to Greece has monopolised public 
attention, media discourses, state policies and academic research—and 
rightly so—a shift appears to be underway as emigration is back in the 
agenda. Shrinking opportunities and life chances have pushed many 
Greeks out of the country, especially youth, persons with higher 
educational attainments, as well as increasingly people in need. At the 
dawn of the new millennium, the crisis signals a complexification or even 
a turnaround of Greece’s migration transition, as emigration flows in the 
post-2010 period appear to be comparable in size with those of post-war 
decades yet with significant differences from those taking place in 
previous decades. Even though the majority of the migrants are young 
university graduate adults, the emigrant population overall is 
considerably more diverse than that of previous decades. The emigrants 
are people of various income groups, educational backgrounds and 
specializations and of various age groups. They are heading to a wide 
array of destinations spanning the globe, with the EU, and particularly 
Britain and Germany, attracting the bulk of them.   
Free movement within the EU makes emigration an easier mobility 
strategy to pursue, as people increasingly move spontaneously and 
provisionally, looking for potential opportunities mostly in Western and 
Northern Europe. At the same time people are not supported by state 
institutions in their emigration trajectories as was the case in the post-
war period, and their socio-economic background and social capital 
shape their emigration trajectories. These, in turn, like the backgrounds 
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of migrants themselves, are characterized by considerable diversity. 
People specialized in fields for which there is high demand can easily 
secure employment abroad, in many cases even before they actually 
emigrate. However, people with lower education, or education that is 
not valued highly in the labour market of their destination countries, or 
for which fluency in the language of that country is needed, find it much 
more difficult to find employment that matches their qualifications. If 
they lack the necessary economic resources to invest further in their 
training and education or to support themselves until they build their 
social networks in the receiving country and better their language skills, 
they may end up working for extended periods in jobs below their skills.  
Through time, however, the broad picture is one of progress, as the vast 
majority of the migrants eventually do upgrade their living conditions 
while acquiring new experiences, skills and knowledge. They constitute 
an extremely valuable human capital resource for the Greek society and 
economy upon which the Greek governments could capitalize. In the 
current circumstances, this could not be done focusing on a repatriation 
policy, since return within the near future forms not a plan neither a 
wish for most of them. Rather, it could be accomplished by facilitating 
the establishment of means of cooperation, which could lead to 
development of viable and sustained transnational ties between them 
and the Greek society and economy. 
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